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SeSSion 13
eMeRGinG PoLiCY AnD PRACTiCe iSSUeS
Steven L. Schooner  
Nash & Cibinic Professor of Government Procurement Law 
The George Washington University
David J. Berteau  
President & CEO  
The Professional Services Council
i. oFF To A RoCKY START.  
In retrospect, 2018 would have been a good year to get out of the prediction market.  Simply, nothing 
we experienced in 2017 or 2018 makes us terribly confident in predicting what is in store for 2019 and 
beyond.  We’re hard pressed to recall starting a calendar year with a similar sense of trepidation and 
uncertainty with regard to what to expect on Pennsylvania Avenue, from the White House to the Capitol. 
We’re increasingly sympathetic to those who, over the last couple of years, have found the rapidly spinning 
news cycle exhausting, overwhelming, and stressful.  It’s not an environment that suggests, going forward, 
we should expect stable leadership and staffing, reliable appropriations and program funding, comfortable 
contractual relationships, and proactive, meaningful, efficient long-term reform.  All of which only increases 
anxiety in the government contracting policy and practice spheres, because uncertainty and instability 
threaten or undercut, among other things, efforts to engage in effective tradeoff analyses and planning, 
making efficient, long-term investment decisions, maintaining healthy contractual relationships, proactively 
investing in hiring, developing, and training personnel (needed today and in the future), while, instead, 
permitting a regressive overemphasis on cost savings rather than focusing on programmatic outcomes 
as a principal goal of the acquisition process. None of which is a cause for optimism.  On a more positive 
note, many agencies enjoyed an agreement on funding and full year appropriations, which led, in turn, 
to increases in contract obligations for FY18.  (More on this below.)  In addition, the backlog in security 
clearance background investigations finally began to decline, falling by more than 100,000 by year’s end.
ii. A PARTiAL SHUTDoWn:  eARLY APPRoPRiATionS SUCCeSSeS FAiL To AVoiD
enD-oF-THe-CALenDAR YeAR inSTABiLiTY.
In a year when the Defense Department appropriation and a number of others (Energy and Water 
Development; Labor, Health & Human Services, Education; Legislative Branch; Military Construction, and 
Veterans Affairs) were passed in a timely manner, we could be forgiven if we had not expected a(nother) 
government shut-down, albeit a partial one. (It had been more than a decade since DoD, and more than 15 
years since the other agencies, began the fiscal year with full year appropriations.) The current impasse 
and (again, partial) shut-down commenced with the expiration of continuing resolutions (CR’s) on Decem-
ber 21, 2018 – animated by the Administration’s demand for (generally) $5 billion for construction of the 
Department of Homeland Security, Customs and Border Patrol Southern border wall and power-shift in 
(and surge of energy from) the Democratic-majority House of Representatives.
Time will tell how disruptive this shutdown becomes.  While all signs indicate that this shut-down 
may achieve historical significance in terms of longevity, its impact is, at least somewhat, tempered by its 
limited scope.  Conversely, nothing about suspending/interrupting government functions bodes well, and 
the impact on the public, the economy, civil servants, and, of course, contractor personnel are unfortunate 
and, sadly, largely avoidable.  Of course, no one “wins” in a government shutdown, and federal contractors 
Reprinted from Thomson ReuTeRs’ GoveRnmenT ConTRaCTs YeaR In RevIew CoveRInG 2018 ConfeRenCe BRIefs, 
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are often the biggest losers. That’s a shame, to the extent that federal con-
tractors play an essential role in helping agencies achieve their missions and 
deliver services to the American people. And, of course, the longer a shutdown 
lasts, the greater the cost to the public, the economy, and federal agencies.
iii. oPAQUe GRoWTH BeLoW THe RADAR: HiGH VoLUMe, 
LoWeR DoLLAR PRoCUReMenTS: THe neW  
THReSHoLDS AnD SCHeDULe ConSoLiDATion
A. Micro-purchase and simplified acquisition thresholds.  Look-
ing back, one of last year’s most dramatic policy and practice changes – in 
terms of impacting the broadest segment of the acquisition community and 
the private sector – will fly largely under the radar, … and that’s the whole 
point.  Pursuant to the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 
Section 821, the micro-purchase threshold experienced a dramatic, greater-
than-inflation-adjusted, bump up to $10,000 for all agencies (including DoD). 
Congress Passes FY 2019 NDAA, 60 GC ¶ 241.  (Although, as the end of 
Calendar Year 2018 approached, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 
had not yet been amended to reflect that increase, DoD raised the threshold 
by class deviation on August 31, 2018.)  But the longstanding $2,000 cap on 
construction – tied to the Davis-Bacon Act, which has never been indexed – 
remains. The micro-purchase threshold for contingencies, emergencies, and 
major disasters is now $20,000 (domestic) and $30,000 (for work outside the 
U.S.)  See https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA002260-
18-DPC.pdf. We’ve come a long way since the late 1990’s, when the micro-
purchase authority was established, as part of the reform and streamlining 
movement, and dramatically expanded reliance on the Governmentwide 
commercial purchase card (yes, the then-nascent Government charge card). 
DoD Gears Up for Simplified Micropurchases, 40 GC ¶ 192.
Meanwhile, the simplified acquisition threshold increased Govern-
ment-wide from $150,000 (which has been inflation adjusted) to $250,000. For 
contingencies, emergencies, and major disasters, the limit is now $750,000 
(domestic) and $1.5 million (for work outside the U.S.), with a $500,000 thresh-
old for humanitarian and peace-keeping procurements outside the U.S. The 
government has yet to take full advantage of this increase, and agencies and 
contractors would do well to push for reliance on this flexibility.
Experience suggests there will be problems, but they’ll also largely oc-
cur below the radar screen. Arguably, that’s the whole point: out of sight, 
out of mind.  From a policy perspective, Congress is betting, and we tend to 
agree, that reduced transactions costs for massive numbers of transactions 
will more than offset any losses, higher prices, fraud, and abuse facilitated 
by the streamlined approach and reduced oversight associated with micro-
purchases and simplified acquisitions.  By analogy, see, e.g., GSA Travel 
Card Program Needs Better Oversight, IG Says, 60 GC ¶ 301 (IG found that, 
although cardholders were using their travel cards inappropriately, supervi-
sors did not receive the questionable charges reports in a timely manner, and 
cardholders continued to make inappropriate charges undetected); Develop-
ments In Brief(a): DOD IG Finds Incomplete Purchase Card Reports to OMB, 
60 GC ¶ 126, DODIG-2018-101, DoD Reporting of Charge Card Misuse to 
OMB, available at media.defense.gov/2018/Apr/09/2001900779/-1/-1/1/
DODIG-2018-101.PDF.  See also, CIGIE Finds High-Risk Transactions Using 
Purchase Cards, 60 GC ¶ 216 (Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity 
and Efficiency (CIGIE) randomly sampled 1,255 of 1.8 million transactions 
totaling over $941 million from 2016-2017, and found that 40 percent did not 
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comply with applicable policies in the following major risk categories: split 
transactions, sales tax transactions, transactions from unauthorized third-
party merchants, and transactions from prohibited and questions merchant 
category codes (MCCs)), available at www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/
oig-reports/CIGIE_Purchase_Card_Initiative_Report_July_2018.pdf.
B. Consolidating the GSA Schedules.  On a more observably dramatic 
note, in late November, GSA announced that it will consolidate its 24 Multiple 
Award Schedules (MAS) into one single Schedule for both products and services. 
GSA Administrator, Emily Murphy, explained that this responds to government 
and business partner feedbacl. “Reforming our schedules will improve customer 
service, make it easier for small businesses to access the schedules program, 
reduce duplication for all our vendors, and allows GSA’s workforce to focus on 
delivering solutions….”  GSA Announces Transformation of Multiple Awards 
Schedules, https://www.gsa.gov/about-us/newsroom/news-releases/gsa-
announces-transformation-of-multiple-awards-schedules.  See also, 60 ¶ 366(a). 
Federal Acquisition Service Commissioner Alan Thomas explained that the 
consolidation will “provide a single entry point to MAS with consistent practices 
applied across the program and save vendors from the burden of managing 
contracts on multiple schedules.” At a minimum, it will be interesting to watch 
how the community progresses up the learning curve and, among other things, 
adapts its vocabulary to the new regime. (Our sense is that the familiar “Sched-
ule 70” is as ingrained in the information technology (IT) lexicon as, say, “1102” 
is among government contracting professionals.)   On a related note, see GSA 
Needs To Refine Transactional Data Metrics For MAS Pilot, 60 GC ¶ 230; see 
also Audit of Transactional Data Reporting Pilot Evaluation Plan and Metrics, 
available at www.gsaig.gov/sites/default/files/audit-reports/A140143_2.pdf. 
Readers may also be interested in GSA Interact’s “Multiple Award Schedules” 
blog, at https://interact.gsa.gov/groups/multiple-award-schedules.  See also, 
MAS Vendors Need Guidance, Training On OLM Authority, Industry Group 
Says, 60 GC ¶ 127 (Coalition for Government Procurement urged GSA to is-
sue guidance and provide training on the new authority to procure order-level 
materials on MAS task and delivery orders); GSAR Final Rule Allows Order-
Level Materials On MAS Orders, 60 GC ¶ 29, 83 Fed. Reg. 3275 (Jan. 24, 2018), 
after multiple rounds of comments to the original 2016 proposed rule, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 62445 (Sept. 9, 2016) (requiring, inter alia, three quotes for orders above 
the simplified acquisition threshold). 
iV. noW “ACTinG”: CHURninG AT THe ToP, VACAnCieS,  
ConTinUeD TRAnSiTionS.  
Two years into the current administration, and we’re still not fully ac-
customed to the vacancy and turnover rates in high level (e.g., up to, and 
including, cabinet level), politically-appointed leadership.  And nothing sug-
gests that 2019 will bring a wave of nominations to fill critical positions with 
highly qualified individuals committed to serving in specific capacities for 
lengthy periods of time.
Still Waiting at oFPP.  We would be remiss if we did not take this 
(now annual) opportunity to remind readers that the current Administra-
tion has not nominated a candidate to serve as Administrator of the Office 
of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP).  Given the number of vacancies and 
acting appointments generally – and, most obviously, at high(er) levels, such 
as Cabinet-level positions – we are no longer holding our breath.  Given 
the longstanding, demonstrated competence of the career staff to operate 
without political leadership, we hesitate to elevate this to crisis level, but we 
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consider it disappointing and consider it a squandered opportunity.  Among 
other things, because the OFPP Administrator is a leading face and voice for 
the profession, the vacancy does not bode well the perception of procurement 
process and the morale of the acquisition community.
Nor do we expect much focused leadership on procurement from elsewhere, 
such as the higher levels within the office of Management and Budget 
(oMB), where leadership is on the move and wearing multiple hats.  OMB 
Director Mick Mulvaney already was spending half his time simultaneously 
running the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), and the OMB’s 
deputy director, Margaret Weichert, was tapped to also run the Office of Per-
sonnel Management (OPM). Then, in December, the President announced 
that Mulvaney would serve as acting White House chief of staff.  Russell T. 
Vought was quickly elevated to acting OMB director, though an official an-
nouncement has not yet been made. Maybe the partial shutdown will offer 
OMB acting director Vought an opportunity to settle in his new role.  Contrast 
this with what appears to be vigorous and knowledgeable procurement lead-
ership elsewhere in government, including GSA, where Emily Murphy has 
taken significant steps (see the discussion of schedule consolidation, above).
Changing of the Guard at DoD:  We assume we were not alone in fail-
ing to anticipate that the resignation of Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
would make way for Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan to serve as 
– for now – Acting Secretary of Defense. (Of course, this is not unprecedented; 
the last time the deputy secretary served a lengthy period was 1989, when 
William Howard Taft IV held the position for two months.)  Meanwhile, at 
DPAC/DPAP, Shay Assad is returning to his position as Director for Pricing 
and Contracting Initiatives, and Kim Herrington is currently serving as the 
Acting Principal Director for Defense Pricing and Contracting (DPC).  In a 
bizarre and unrelated twist, earlier in the year, on August 21, DPAP alerted 
the public of a potential scam, that an individual may be impersonating Shay 
Assad by email and/or telephone in an attempt to obtain software/equipment/
etc. Truth is stranger than fiction.
V.  DeFenSe ACQUiSiTion: A FReSH START, DiSAGGReGATion 
(oR WHen “oTHeR” BeCoMeS THe noRM), AnD TRYinG 
To MAKe SenSe oF iT ALL
A. The Section 809 Panel.  By the time this conference begins, we’ll 
have had an opportunity to see, and, hopefully, digest, the final Section 809 
Panel report, scheduled for “the big reveal” in mid-January. (Recall that NDAA 
Section 809 for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, required the Secretary 
of Defense to establish an advisory panel on streamlining and codifying 
acquisition regulations. The massive study panel has been working on five 
target areas: (1) establishing and administering appropriate buyer and seller 
relationships; (2) improving the functioning of the system; (3) ensuring the 
continuing financial and ethical integrity of defense procurement programs; 
(4) protecting the best interests of DoD; and (5) eliminating any regulations 
that are unnecessary for the purposes described.) See generally, https://
section809panel.org.  Among other things, we’ll be curious to see what the 
809 panel recommends with regard to reining in bid protests. ABA Section 
Criticizes 809 Panel’s Proposals To Limit Bid Protests; 60 GC ¶ 167; RAND 
Study Finds More DOD Protests, But No Flood Of Frivolous Protests, 60 GC 
¶ 18; Steven L. Schooner, Bid Protests: The RAND Study Of DOD Protests At 
The GAO And The COFC, 32 N&CR ¶ 10 (February 2018); Christopher Yukins 
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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and Daniel Ramish, Feature Comment: Section 809 And ‘e-Portal’ Proposals, 
By Cutting Bid Protests In Federal Procurement, Could Breach International 
Agreements And Raise New Risks Of Corruption, 60 GC ¶ 138; CRS Surveys 
Bid Protest Forum Distinctions, 60 GC ¶ 299; David H. Carpenter & Moshe 
Schwartz, Government Contract Bid Protests: Analysis of Legal Processes 
and Recent Developments (R45080, November 28, 2018) (“Congress might 
utilize the information gained from … studies, reports, and pilot programs 
to inform its consideration of substantive legislative reforms to the bid pro-
test system[, … including] implementation of certain recommendations in 
the RAND report or making permanent, expanding, or eliminating the pilot 
program that requires certain contractors to reimburse the government for 
the costs associated with adjudicating unsuccessful protests.”), available at 
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45080.
Among other things, we’re curious to see if and how the 809 Panel report 
addresses the concern that, increasingly, the FAR and DoD’s Procedures, 
Guidance, and information (PGi) don’t accurately reflect practice in 
the field.  For example, in a recent report, GAO explained that orders under 
indefinite-delivery contracts comprised roughly 40 percent of DoD obligations 
in fiscal years 2015 through 2017. In that context, we find it remarkable how 
inadequately the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) describes the process 
through which 40 percent of DoD’s acquisition spending flows.  For example, 
GAO notes that, despite FAR 16.500(a)’s established preference for multiple 
awards, “[o]f the DOD awards for the indefinite-delivery /indefinite-quantity 
(IDIQ) contract type during this period, about three-quarters were made to 
a single contractor, rather than multiple contractors.” Indeed, Table 1 sug-
gests that GAO under-stated the single-award trend; the Table’s numbers of 
transactions indicated that single award IDIQ’s represented 79 percent of all 
DoD IDIQ’s in 2015, 78 percent in 2016, and a whopping 85 percent in 2017. 
(For FY17, that’s 6,242 single-award indefinite-delivery contracts (that were 
competed), 2,069 single-award indefinite-delivery contracts (that were not 
competed), and only 1,423 multiple-award indefinite-delivery contracts.) If 
85 percent of DoD’s IDIQ’s in FY 2017 were single awards, the policy favoring 
multiple awards is teetering on the verge of dead letter. See, e.g., Steven L. 
Schooner, Indefinite-Delivery/Indefinite-Quantity Contracts: Time To Correlate 
Practice And Policy?, 32 n&CR ¶ 44 (September 2018); GAO-18-412R, Defense 
Contracting: Use by the Department of Defense of Indefinite-Delivery Contracts 
from Fiscal Years 2015 through 2017, (May 10, 2018), available at https://
www.gao.gov/products/GAO-18-412R.  See also, Navy Not Preparing D&Fs 
For IDIQ Contracts, IG Says, 60 GC ¶ 45 (This appears to be largely a tech-
nical/compliance failure, rather than an omission: the D&Fs reviewed were 
incomplete, lacking the necessary rationales.), see DODIG-2018-069, Navy’s 
Single Award Indefinite-Delivery Indefinite Quantity Contracts, available at 
media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/05/2001873543/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-069.
PDF; Section 809 Panel Seeks To Streamline DOD Commercial Buying, 60 GC 
¶ 46 (among other things, we’re pleased to see that the report says: “Rather 
than focusing on price and process to measures success, [DOD’s] acquisition 
system should focus on outcomes....”).
B. The Section 813 Panel.  Meanwhile, the 813 Government-industry 
advisory panel, established in the FY 2016 NDAA § 813 (as amended by FY 
2017 NDAA § 809(f)(1)), completed its review 10 USCA §§ 2320 and 2321, 
regarding rights in technical data and their implementing regulations.  See, 
2018 Report: Government-Industry Advisory Panel on Technical Data Rights 
(November 13, 2018), available at http://www.ndia.org/-media/Sites/NDIA/
NOTES
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Policy/Documents/Final%20Section%20813%20Report. The report’s analysis 
is built around a host of topics, including the business model, acquisition plan-
ning and requirements, source selection and post source selection, IP licensing, 
balancing the interests of the parties, implementation, compliance/admin-
istrative, data acquisition, and modular open systems approaches (MOSA). 
While the panel seemed united in agreeing that DoD acquisition profession-
als require more training in intellectual property right-related procurement 
issues, we are confident this will be addressed at greater length in Chapter 
12 of these materials. See also, generally, Daniel J. Kelly, IP Rights Under 
NASA and DoD “Other Transaction” Agreements - Inventions and Patents, 
18-9 BRIefInG PaPeRs (August 2018); W. Jay DeVecchio, Taking the Mystery 
Out of Data Rights, 18-8 BRIefInG PaPeRs (July 2018); Ralph C. Nash, Valida-
tion of Technical Data: Statutory Changes, 32 N&CR ¶ 49; Ralph C. Nash, 
Postscript: Obtaining More Rights in Technical Data and Computer Software, 
32 N&CR  ¶ 38 (“We are seeing more protests concerning the efforts of the 
military services to obtain sufficient information with accompanying rights 
to reduce the cost of sustainment of their weapon systems without violating 
the statutory prohibition of demanding such rights.”).
On December 7, 2018, on the heels of the final 813 Panel report, Army 
Secretary Mark T. Esper issued Army Directive 2018-26, Enabling Moderniza-
tion Through the Management of Intellectual Property, with a stated goal is 
reducing life cycle cost for Army programs, and focused on the Army buying 
“just enough” IP.   See https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/
pdf/web/ARN14261_AD2018_26_Final.pdf.   With the decentralization of 
program acquisition from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to 
the Military Departments, this directive applies only to the Army.  However, 
USD(A&S) Ellen Lord has indicated that her team is working on a DoD-wide 
IP policy, which has yet to be provided for review and comment.
C. DoD Progress Payments Dust-up Resolved (or Deferred). For 
now, DoD’s controversial (dare we say “incendiary”?) proposal to lower the 
progress payment rate and performance-based payment rate has been de-
railed.  Following a September 21, 2018 letter from the chairs of the House 
and Senate Armed Services committees, Representative Mac Thornberry 
(R-TX) and Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK), then-Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Patrick Shanahan called the proposal “fundamentally flawed,” after which, 
on October 1, the proposed rule was withdrawn. See also, Industry Decries 
DFARS Proposed Rule On Performance-Based Payments, Progress Payments, 
60 GC ¶ 305 (Council of Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA), 
National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), and Aerospace Industries 
Association (AIA) and the Professional Services Council (PSD) urged DOD to 
allow for “a more fulsome discussion” of the DFARS proposed rule); Industry 
Group Opposes DFARS Performance-Based Payment Proposed Rule, 60 GC ¶ 
293; DOD Proposes DFARS Incentive Structure For Progress Payments And 
Performance-Based Payments, 60 GC ¶ 276; 83 Fed. Reg. 42831 (Aug. 24, 
2018).  See PSC’s comments at www.pscouncil.org/Downloads/documents/
Advocacy-Policy Docs/Progress Payments 9.14.18 Public Meeting Statement 
(FINAL).pdf.  Stay tuned, however: in December, USD(A&S) Lord indicated 
that the issue may return, but that DoD would more proactively involve in-
dustry in crafting the rule.
D. Focus on PALT.   Section 886 of the FY18 NDAA requires the Secre-
tary of Defense to develop, make available for public comment, and finalize a 
DoD-wide definition of the term “Procurement Administrative Lead Time” or 
© 2019 Thomson Reuters
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“PALT.” See DARS-2018-0005, 83 Fed. Reg. 5762 (February 9, 2018).  DoD is 
proposing to define PALT as “the time between the date on which the initial 
solicitation for a contract or task order of the Department of Defense is issued 
and the date of the award of the contract or task order.” DoD plans to use 
Federal Procurement Data System—Next Generation (FPDS-NG) to measure 
and publicly disseminate PALT data.  In a March 12, 2018 letter, the Council 
on Defense and Space Industry Associations (CODSIA) supported harmoniz-
ing the definition of, and then tracking, PALT. CODSIA also suggested “that 
buying activities should have the flexibility to track PALT at an earlier stage[, 
which would …] not only aid buying activities in managing their acquisitions, 
[but also] … provide greater opportunities for the Department to reduce the 
time spent on such acquisitions. ... [Particularly] for complex information 
technology or other services acquisitions, or major systems purchases, the 
time between a requirements determination and solicitation may be the lon-
ger period in the acquisition lifecycle. Not only is this worth capturing and 
reporting, it should be a principal focus of reduction efforts.” Letter available 
at DARS-2018-0005 http://www.codsia.org/uploads/6/8/9/9/68991301/
codsia_comments_dars-2018-0005_-_palt_-_final_-_12_mar_18.pdf. 
e. Transparency: every Little Bit Helps. We’re also pleased to hear 
that USD(A&S) Lord intends to promote transparency by restricting use of 
“For Official Use Only” designations on various acquisition reports. (This 
would be a breath of fresh air amidst an administration that has consistently 
moved in the wrong direction on transparency.) See https://www.executivegov.
com/2019/01/ellen-lord-sets-plan-to-promote-pentagon-wide-acquisition-
transparency/.
F. The end of the LPTA era?  We applaud Congressional and DoD cog-
nizance of, focus on, and commitment to, ending the scourge of over-reliance 
on, and misuse of, lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) competitions. 
The wheels on this are moving slowly, but, apparently, they’re still moving. 
Comments on DOD’s proposed rule, available at 83 Fed. Reg. 62550 (December 
4, 2018), are due in early February. As late as November, GAO bemoaned that 
the FY17 NDAA, Section 813, “mandated that DOD revise its regulations to 
require that eight criteria be considered when using the LPTA process. As 
of September 2018, DOD had not yet done so.”  The eight criteria (including 
the two added in the FY18 NDAA) that that DOD contracting officers must 
ensure before issuing a solicitation on an LPTA basis are:
•	 DOD	can	clearly	describe	the	minimum	requirements	in	terms	
of performance objectives, measures, and standards that will be 
used to determine acceptability of offers.
•	 DOD	would	realize	no,	or	little,	value	from	a	proposal	exceeding	
the solicitation’s minimum technical requirements.
•	 The	proposed	technical	approaches	can	be	evaluated	with	little	
or no subjectivity as to the desirability of one versus the other.
•	 There	is	a	high	degree	of	certainty	that	a	review	of	technical	pro-
posals other than that of the lowest-price offeror would not identify 
factors that could provide other benefits to the government.
•	 The	contracting	officer	has	included	a	justification	for	the	use	of	
the LPTA process in the contract file.
•	 The	lowest	price	reflects	full	life-cycle	costs,	including	for	opera-
tions and support. (We’re ecstatic to see life-cycling costing gain 
increased visibility.)
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•	 DOD	would	 realize	 little	 or	no	additional	 innovation	or	 future	
technological advantage by using a different methodology.
•	 For	the	acquisition	of	goods,	the	goods	being	purchased	are	pre-
dominantly expendable in nature, nontechnical, or have a short 
life expectancy or shelf life.
GAO also recommended that the DFARS should clarify how officials should 
apply the criteria that goods be expendable, nontechnical or short-lived, and 
that the lowest price reflects full life-cycle costs.  “Absent additional direction, 
contracting officials across DOD may not understand how to consistently ap-
ply these criteria when using the LPTA process,” GAO cautioned.
See DOD Should Clarify Statutory LPTA Criteria, 60 GC ¶ 357, GAO-19-
54, Defense Contracting: DOD Should Clarify Criteria for Using Lowest Price 
Technically Acceptable Process (November 2018) (“GAO estimates that about 
26 percent of [DoD’s FY2017] contracts and orders valued $5 million and above 
… were competitively awarded using the …[LPTA] process.”), available at 
www.gao.gov/assets/700/695352.pdf.  See also, David Berteau, PSC Letter 
to Kevin Fahey (November 20, 2018), expressing serious concerns regarding 
DoD’s continued delay of overdue and statutorily mandated regulations re-
stricting the use of LPTA source selection criteria for DoD services contracts. 
While PSC acknowledges a place for LPTA, when used appropriately, “apply-
ing LPTA to complex professional or IT services where higher-level technical 
capabilities and innovation are often sought, and where the contracting re-
quirements are often difficult to accurately define, is particularly ill-advised.” 
PSC also notes that “[e]xcluding task orders from the LPTA restrictions would 
be inconsistent with the procurement and acquisition definitions contained 
in the [FAR] and with the Congressional intent behind [NDAA] Section 813.” 
Available at https://www.pscouncil.org/.  
G. A Resurgence for other Transactions (oT’s) and experimental 
Authorities?  Congress continues to signal its support for flexibility, creativ-
ity, innovation, and working around the existing framework for many types 
of projects.  The big news last year was USD(A&S) Lord issuing a new – and 
dramatically different – Other Transactions (OT) Guide, available at https://
aaf.dau.mil/ot-guide. (The Other Transactions Guide for Prototype Projects 
(version 1.2.0, January 2017) was rescinded in its entirety and replaced by 
this guide.)  In describing the purpose of other transactions (OT’s), the guide 
explains that:
The OT authorities were created to give DoD the flexibility necessary to 
adopt and incorporate business practices that reflect commercial industry 
standards and best practices into its award instruments. When leveraged 
appropriately, OTs provide the Government with access to state-of-the-art 
technology solutions from traditional and Non-Traditional Defense Contrac-
tors, through a multitude of potential teaming arrangements tailored to the 
particular project and the needs of the participants.
We appreciate the fact that the guide was “intended for two primary audi-
ences, both the Government team, to include Project Managers, Agreements 
Officers (AOs), Agreements Specialists, Systems Engineers, Small Business 
representatives, Legal Counsel; and Government partners, to include Indus-
try, Academia, other Federal agencies, and State and Local authorities ….” 
The guide stakes out some boundaries early on, emphasizing that OTs are 
not FAR-based procurement contracts, grants, cooperative agreements, or 
Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs).  Conversely, 
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OT’s may help DoD:
•	 Foster	new	relationships	and	practices	involving	traditional	and	
nontraditional defense contractor (or NDCs), especially those 
that may not be interested in doing FAR based contracts with the 
Government
•	 Broaden	the	industrial	base	available	to	Government
•	 Support	dual-use	projects
•	 Encourage	flexible,	quicker,	and	cheaper	project	design	and	execu-
tion
•	 Leverage	commercial	industry	investment	in	technology	develop-
ment and to partner with industry to ensure DoD requirements 
are included in future technologies and products
•	 Collaborate	in	innovative	arrangements
After a brief overview, the guide proceeds in three parts: (1) Planning; (2) 
Publicizing, Soliciting, and Evaluating (concluding, basically, with award); and 
(3) Administration (or what we might call post-award contract, agreement, or 
relationship management).  Weighing in at approximately 125 pages (in the 
PDF version), the online resource is informative and exhaustive, yet surpris-
ingly accessible, containing, among other things, case studies, a glossary, and 
a chronological history of statutory authority. Notably missing from this list 
(and the guide itself) is the absence of consideration of life-cycle costs and 
sustainment planning for “prototypes” obtained via OT agreements; and there 
is no sign that DoD, other agencies, or the Congress is ready to address this 
significant shortcoming.
Our favorite appendix contains the Common OT Myths and Facts.  (It 
should come as no surprise that the guide refutes all of the following “myths” 
as “false,” and follows with brief explanations:
1. There is only one type of OT available to DoD.
2. The OT authorities are new and are rarely used.
3. Since an OT is termed an “agreement,” it is not a contract.
4. Since CICA does not apply, competition and fairness are not con-
sidered.
5. OTs Cannot be Protested.
6. None of the federal statutes or regulations apply to OTs.
7. OTs can only be awarded through a consortium.
8. The OT authorities can only use RDT&E appropriations.
9. Anyone in DoD can award an OT.
10. OTs will always be faster to award than other contractual instru-
ments.
See also, DOD A&S Undersecretary Issues ‘Other Transactions’ Guidance, 
60 GC ¶ 365; Richard L. Dunn, Feature Comment: DOD Other Transactions 
Guide—A Breath Of Fresh Air, 60 GC ¶ 362 (“The new Guide makes it clear 
that it is truly a guide in several ways. Its lay-out and style are a complete 
departure from the prior Guide and cannot be mistaken for a regulation. It 
contains highlighted case studies, a glossary of definitions, and a collection 
of common misunderstandings and myths….”).  We also applaud DoD’s guid-
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ance that requires that “Other transactions” agreements (OTAs) for proto-
types must be reported in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). 
See 60 GC ¶ 292(c); available at www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/
USA002363-18-DPC.pdf.  See also, Richard L. Dunn, Practitioner’s Comment: 
GAO Sustains OTA Protest, 60 GC ¶ 195 (discussing Oracle Am., Inc., Comp. 
Gen. Dec. B-416061, 2018 CPD ¶ 180, finding that a follow-on production 
OTA was improper because (1) the initial prototype OT did not include a 
provision for a follow-on OT, and (2) the underlying prototype OT was not 
completed; Dunn asserts that GAO’s ‘business as usual’ approach to OT’s “is 
clearly wrong and harmful” to the overall reform effort. It is instructive to 
note, however, that DoD raised no public objection to GAO’ precedent-setting 
decision.); Vernon J. Edwards, Sad Commentary: Rules, Or The Lack Thereof, 
Won’t Make Acquisition Agile And Innovative, 33 N&CR ¶ 5; Richard L. 
Dunn, Other Transaction Agreements: What Applies?, 32 N&CR ¶ 22 Ralph 
C. Nash, Other Transactions: A Preferred Technique?, 32 N&CR ¶ 8 (“Does 
additional complexity produce better outcomes? It will be interesting to find 
out.”); Armani Vadiee and Todd M. Garland, The Federal Government’s “Other 
Transaction” Authority, 18-5 BRIefInG PaPeRs (April 2018).
H. The State of the industrial Base.  We’ve previously bemoaned – 
throughout much of the prior administration’s Better Buying Power (BBP) 
initiative, with its apparent prioritization of reducing contractor profits and 
overhead expenses, including independent research and development – the 
lack of attention paid to DoD’s industrial base.  Industrial base issues are 
surely to be invigorated by the 140-page report of the interagency task force 
established pursuant to Executive Order 13806 (82 Fed. Reg. 34597 (July 
26, 2017)).  
We also continue to be frustrated that neither the Executive Order nor 
the report addresses the business base that provides half of all contract sup-
port for national security, via contracts for services and solutions rather than 
products.  The vulnerabilities in logistics, sustainment, and support services 
are likely to be at least as widespread as those in the component supply chain, 
but the lack of attention to those vulnerabilities means too little is known 
about them and, accordingly, too little is being done to address them.  To date, 
neither DoD nor the White House has publicly acknowledged these problems. 
Notwithstanding that shortcoming, the study sets a valued benchmark and 
provides for needed actions.  Three of the major findings animate much of 
what follows, and none are surprising:
•	 A	surprising	level	of	 foreign	dependence	on	competitor	nations	
exists;
•	 Workforce	challenges	face	employers	across	all	sectors;	and
•	 Many	 sectors	 continue	 to	move	 critical	 capabilities	 offshore	 in	
pursuit of competitive pricing and access to foreign markets.
We found that the other major finding was potentially the most sophis-
ticated and under-appreciated: the task force articulated that impacts and 
risks primarily affect “sub-tiers” of the supply chains, rather than the major 
(or top-tier, or name brand, or conventional) prime contractors.  The report 
then identifies “five macro forces driving risk” into the industrial base:
1. sequestration and uncertainty of U.S. Government spending;
2. decline of U.S. manufacturing capabilities and capacity;
3. deleterious U.S. Government business and procurement practices;
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4. industrial policies of competitor nations; and
5. diminishing U.S. STEM and trade skills.
That’s a daunting list. The report then turns to “ten risk archetypes” that 
threaten the manufacturing and industrial base: sole source, single source, 
fragile source, fragile market, capacity constrained supply market, foreign 
dependency, diminishing manufacturing sources and material shortages, 
gaps in U.S.-based human capital, erosion of U.S.-based infrastructure, and 
product security.  For better or worse, the report includes a dizzying array of 
recommendations – large and small – at four levels: investment, policy, regu-
lation, and legislation.  Looking at the list – with recommendations ranging 
from the practical (reducing the personnel security clearance backlog through 
more efficient processes) to the aspirational (accelerating workforce develop-
ment efforts to grow domestic science, technology, engineering, mathematics 
(STEM), and critical trade skills) – offers a stark insight into the long-term 
challenges faced in maintaining, let alone enhancing, the industrial base.  We 
also expect readers will be particularly interested in the “sector summaries,” 
subdivided into traditional defense sectors (think aircraft, munitions, ship-
building, nuclear, space, and “soldier systems”) and “cross-cutting” sectors 
(such as machine tooling, materials – both raw and downstream, electronics, 
software, and, of course, cybersecurity). See, Assessing and Strengthening the 
Manufacturing and Defense Industrial Base and Supply Chain Resiliency 
of the United States (September 2018), available at defense.gov/Strength-
eningDefenseIndustrialBase; see also, generally, DOD Task Force Delivers 
EO-Mandated Defense Industrial Base Report To President, 60 GC ¶ 316; 
DOD Faces Challenges Assessing Industrial Base Risks, 60 GC ¶ 197; GAO-
18-435, Defense Industrial Base: Integrating Existing Supplier Data and 
Addressing Workforce Challenges Could Improve Risk Analysis, available at 
www.gao.gov/assets/700/692458.pdf (risks to the industrial base include, for 
example, suppliers’ financial viability, limited capacity, foreign dependence, 
obsolete items, and loss of skills or equipment).  See also, on a related note, 
DOD Acquisitions Must Focus On Supply Chain Security, Nonprofit Says, 60 
GC ¶ 251; Chris Nissen, John Gronager, Robert Metzger & Harvey Rishikof,, 
Deliver Uncompromised: A Strategy for Supply Chain Security and Resilience 
in Response to the Changing Character of War, available at www.mitre.org/
sites/default/files/publications/pr-18-2417-deliver-uncompromised-MITRE-
study-8AUG2018.pdf (“DoD must make better use of its existing resources 
to identify, protect, detect, respond to, and recover from network and supply 
chain threats…. While DoD cannot control all the actions of its numerous 
information system and supply chain participants, it can lead by example 
and use its purchasing power and regulatory authority to move companies to 
work with DoD to enhance security through addressing threat, vulnerabili-
ties, and consequences of its capabilities and adapt to dynamic, constantly 
changing threats.”).
Bear in mind that the concept of “Deliver Uncompromised,” described 
not only in the above report but also in DoD testimony before the House 
Armed Services Committee last June, addresses the problem with emphasiz-
ing security in evaluation criteria for contracts, whether for supply chain or 
services.  That problem is the absence of any agreed-upon way of measuring 
such security.  We know how to measure cost, schedule, and (to a less well-
defined degree) performance, but no one can say with confidence how to 
measure security.  Until we do, this will remain a tough nut to crack and a 
hard problem to define, much less solve.
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i. Modern Tools: Ambrosia? Catnip for Defense Acquisition Geeks? 
Touted as a “new digital tool suite for acquisition policy,” the Digital Acquisi-
tion Prototypes, developed by MITRE for USD(A&S) are, if nothing else, eye-
catching, informative, and user-friendly.  We encourage readers to visit the 
site and engage with these interactive tools.  To the extent that all defense 
acquisition programs require two fundamental elements to execute: an acqui-
sition pathway and a contracting strategy, the tools are intended to, among 
other things assist organizations in selecting the pathway and strategy that 
best meet their program’s needs in a way that complements and supports 
positive program outcomes.  The specific tools are an “adaptive acquisition 
framework” and a “contracting cone.”  DAU explains that, because there are 
many pathways for DoD to deliver capabilities, the Adaptive Acquisition 
Framework tool, see https://aaf.dau.mil/aaf/, helps you select the right 
pathway and provides detailed guidance for each.  The pathways to choose 
from are:
•	 Urgent	Operational	Needs
•	 Middle	Tier	of	Acquisition
•	 Tailorable	Traditional
•	 Acquisition	of	Services
•	 Defense	Business	Systems
The companion Contracting Cone, see https://aaf.dau.mil/contracting-
cone/, outlines the full spectrum of available FAR and Non-FAR contract 
strategies. The supporting materials provide details about each strategy, to 
enable collaborative discussions to select the right strategy based on environ-
ment, constraints, and desired outcomes. The goal is to provide visibility into 
new or lesser known strategies – separated into following FAR-based and 
non-FAR based – and ensure that the full range of contract (and contract-
like) strategies are considered. 
FAR Based Strategies:
•	 Federal	Supply	Schedules	–	FAR	Subpart	8.4
•	 Commercial	Items	–	FAR	Part	12
•	 Simplified	Acquisitions	–	FAR	Part	13
•	 Contracting	by	Negotiation	–	FAR	Part	15
•	 Indefinite	Delivery/Indefinite	Quantity	(IDIQ)	–	FAR	Subpart	16.5
•	 Letter	Contract	(or	undefinitized	contractual	agreement	(UCA))	
– FAR Section 16.603
•	 Agreements	-		written	instruments	of	understanding	containing	
contract clauses (not an actual contract), applying to future con-
tracts – FAR Subpart 16.7
•	 Small	Business	–	FAR	Part	19
•	 Broad	Agency	Announcement	(BAA)	–	FAR	Section	35.016
•	 Small	Business	Innovation	Research	(SBIR)	and	Small	Business	
Technology Transfer (STTR)
•	 Defense	Commercial	Solutions	Opening	(CSO)	Pilot	Program
Non-FAR Based Strategies:
•	 Other	Transactions	(OT)
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•	 Procurement	for	Experimental	Purposes	(10	USCA	§		2373)
•	 Research	and	Development	(R&D)	Agreements,	including	Coop-
erative R&D Agreements (CRADA), Partnership Intermediary 
Agreements (PIA), and Technology Investment Agreements (TIA)
The contracting cone (c’mon, it’s fun to say - try it!) also includes a handy 
(if high level and conclusory) Contract Type Matrix, which maps the con-
tract types that are allowed for each of the major strategies outlined in the 
contracting cone.
J. Major System Performance Assessment: We were disappointed 
that DoD does not appear to have continued publication of the annual as-
sessments of the Defense Acquisition System, which were produced during 
then-USD(AT&L) Frank Kendall’s leadership. This year, however, thanks to 
GAO, we enjoyed a similarly data-rich gold mine of insights into DoD’s major 
system acquisition performance.  See, generally, Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks 
To DOD Weapon Systems Portfolio, 60 GC ¶ 145, GAO-18-360SP, Weapon 
Systems Annual Assessment: Knowledge Gaps Pose Risks to Sustaining 
Recent Positive Trends, available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/691473.pdf. 
Among the innumerable charts and assessments of individual programs, 
GAO offered a dazzling array of observations and insights.  Some of our 
favorites included:
•	 GAO’s	broadest	find	appears	to	be	that	programs	that	implemented	
acquisition strategies to promote competition, including competi-
tive award of contracts, reported decreases in total acquisition cost 
estimates as compared to others.
•	 DOD’s	2017	portfolio	grew	both	in	number	of	programs	(to	86)	and	
cost (more than $1.66 trillion – we willingly concede that that’s a 
lot of money).
•	 Programs	 in	DOD’s	2017	portfolio	experienced	a	slight	gain	 in	
buying power—meaning DOD is able to buy more goods or services 
for the same level of funding.
•	 Although	the	2017	portfolio	experienced	more	than	$535	billion	in	
cost growth over the original estimates, most of that growth ($464 
billion or 86 percent) occurred prior to 2012.
•	 The	25	programs	(representing	29	percent	of	the	current	portfolio)	
initiated since 2010 currently demonstrate better cost performance 
than older programs. GAO concluded that the acquisition reforms 
implemented that year (and later) were a driving factor behind 
the cost changes.
•	 On	a	less	positive	note,	most	programs	did	not	fully	demonstrate	
system design stability prior to conducting Critical Design Re-
views; none of the programs fully demonstrated manufacturing 
processes that were in statistical control prior to starting produc-
tion; and, for more than a third of the current programs GAO 
reviewed, DoD declared, or intend to declare, initial operational 
capability on the basis of limited (or no) initial operational test 
and evaluation.
In a somewhat related, but arguably broader, study, GAO offered a retro-
spective on some of the more recent acquisition reforms.  See GAO Surveys Ac-
quisition Reforms Over A Decade After SARA Panel, 60 GC ¶ 281, GAO-18-627, 
Federal Acquisitions: Congress and the Executive Branch Have Taken Steps 
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to Address Key Issues, but Challenges Endure (September 2018), available at 
www.gao.gov/assets/700/694457.pdf.  Among other things, GAO noted that:
•	 Despite	questions	about	the	capacity	of	federal	agencies	to	over-
see contractors, agencies continue to award contracts warranting 
increased management attention at a steady rate.
•	 The	 federal	 acquisition	workforce	 faces	workload	and	 training	
challenges, including workforce gaps at DOD and across agencies.
•	 Unrealistic	requirements	continue	to	contribute	to	poor	DoD	pro-
gram outcomes; yet, from 2008 to 2017, the Army’s requirements 
development workforce decreased by 22 percent.
•	 The	government’s	 primary	 repository	 for	 acquisition	data	 con-
tained some unreliable data, and the system has demonstrated 
limitations. (More on this, below.)
•	 Agencies	periodically	use	bridge	contracts	that,	over	time,	delay	
opportunities for competition and can place the government at 
risk of paying higher prices for multiple years. 
K. And Don’t Forget infrastructure. Stepping back from our defense 
focus, one of our initial hopes for this administration was a renewal of in-
frastructure investment, possibly with a greater reliance on public-private 
partnerships (PPP’S or P3).  Remember when there was talk of a massive 
infrastructure infusion – specifically, a campaign promise to invest $550B 
to upgrade the nation’s roads, highways, bridges tunnels, railways, airports, 
transit systems and ports, and maybe even the electrical grid and public wire-
less capacity?  Obviously, that failed to materialize. Indeed, there has been 
little or no discussion about the ever-increasing, and cumulatively cascading, 
need to invest in infrastructure (other than the relentless concerns regarding 
cyber-security, of course).  For a fleeting moment, the bridge disaster in Ge-
noa, Italy, brought the issue back into the public’s consciousness (but, again, 
in the current chaotic news cycle, it had no staying power). See, generally, 
James Glanz, et al., Genoa Bridge Collapse: The Road to Tragedy, The New 
York Times has reconstructed how the disaster happened, from beginning to 
end, new YoRk TImes (September 6, 2018) (extraordinary long-form report-
ing and visually appealing, accessible analysis), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2018/09/06/world/europe/genoa-italy-bridge.html; John Surico, 
What Brought Down the Bridge in Italy? A deadly disaster has focused atten-
tion on the state of infrastructure built during the country’s postwar boom, 
aTlanTIC (August 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/
archive/2018/08/what-brought-down-this-bridge-in-genoa/567625/; Ian 
Bogost, More Bridges Will Collapse: Two disasters in Europe are the latest 
examples of the decline of infrastructure—as an idea as much as a physical 
thing,  aTlanTIC (August 14, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/
archive/2018/08/the-age-of-precarious-infrastructure/567493/; John Miller, 
Restore Nonpartisan Support for Infrastructure, TRansPoRT ToPICs (July 27, 
2018) (“It’s time for Congress to challenge itself to change and once again 
make infrastructure a nonpartisan issue.”), https://www.ttnews.com/articles/
opinion-restore-nonpartisan-support-infrastructure.  
To the extent that GAO has focused on infrastructure, its analysis remains 
more micro than macro, more retrospective than prospective.  See, e.g., GAO: 
Military Should Better Track Contracts Privatizing Utility Systems, 60 GC ¶ 
282, GAO-18-558, Defense Infrastructure: Guidance Needed to Develop Met-
rics and Implement Cybersecurity Requirements for Utilities Privatization 
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Contracts, (since 1997, when Congress authorized privatization of utility 
systems at military installations, DoD has privatized nearly 600 of about 
2,600 utility systems – including electric, water, wastewater, natural gas, and 
thermal systems – on military installations), available at www.gao.gov/as-
sets/700/694219.pdf; GAO Questions MILCON Cost Estimate Reliability, 60 
GC ¶ 105 (two of the three high-value projects GAO examined experienced a 
more than 30-percent increase over initial cost estimates; DOD cost estima-
tors did not follow all the best practices (comprehensive, well-documented, 
accurate, and credible) associated with reliable estimating), GAO-18-101, 
Defense Infrastructure: Action Needed to Increase the Reliability of Construc-
tion Cost Estimates, available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/690892.pdf; and, 
for a specific anecdote, see, DOD Needs Guidance To Improve Medical In-
frastructure Construction Projects, 60 GC ¶ 193, DODIG-2018-125, The Fort 
Bliss Hospital Replacement Military Construction Project, available at media.
defense.gov/2018/Jun/08/2001928750/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-125.PDF.
Vi. iT’S ALL ABoUT PeoPLe: HUMAn CAPiTAL AnD THe AC-
QUiSiTion WoRKFoRCe:  
We continue to believe that the acquisition workforce is critically impor-
tant, and we found plenty of interesting insights in this year’s data-rich Federal 
Acquisition Institute (FAI) and OFPP 2018 Acquisition Workforce Competency 
Survey Report.  See, FAI, OFPP Survey Contracting Workforce Competencies, 
Demographics, 60 GC ¶ 261; 2018 Acquisition Workforce Competency Survey 
Report, available at www.fai.gov/drupal/sites/default/files/2018_Acquisi-
tion_Workforce_Competency_Survey_Report.pdf.  Ultimately, while much of 
this is interesting – and worth discussing – there’s plenty of head-scratching 
and disappointing stuff included as well.  As for the big picture:
The highest-rated competencies were:
•	 Among	FAC-C	(Contracting)	holders:	issuing	changes,	awarding	
contracts, and competition;
•	 Among	FAC-COR	(Contracting	Officer’s	Representative)	holders:	
inspection and acceptance and business acumen and communica-
tion.
•	 Among	FAC-P/PM	(Program	and	Project	Managers)	holders:	lead-
ership.
The lowest proficiency ratings were:
•	 For	FAC-C	holders:	negotiating	forward	pricing	rates	agreements,	
as well as contracting in contingency or combat settings.
•	 For	FAC-COR	holders:	 pre-award	 communication	and	 contract	
negotiation.
•	 For	FAC-P/PM	holders:	systems	engineering.
The data represents a robust, but nonetheless, surprisingly limited, 
sampling of the workforce. A total of 36,836 responses (a significantly larger 
response rate than the FY16 survey) included 25,562 complete survey re-
sponses.  As for coverage:
•	 The	survey	did	not include the Defense Department, which represents 
the lion’s share of the annual procurement budget;
•	 The	highest	response rates were the Department of Labor (almost 
35%), the Small Business Administration (31%), the Department of the 
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Interior (29%), the Department of Education (27%), and the Department of 
Agriculture (27%); yet
•	 The	agencies	with	the	largest	number	of	FAC	responses	–	all	with	
less than 27 percent reporting – were the Department of Veterans Affairs 
(2,568), the Department of Homeland Security (2,325), and the Department 
of Health and Human Services (1,912).
Moreover, if there’s a fundamental flaw in the data, it’s that respondents 
self-rated their own level of proficiency. (But, hey, it is what it is: a survey.) 
More troubling was the observation that a plurality of FAC holders dedicates 
0–25% of their time to acquisition-related activities. (Frankly, we’re not ter-
ribly interested in knowing the competence level of the folks who aren’t do-
ing the work. Although, hypothetically, it’s nice to know that there is depth 
on the bench, in case we need to call on it at some point.)  The demographic 
information was also interesting:
•	 The	most	 common	paygrade,	 the	GS-13	 level,	 represents	 28.7%	of	
FAC holders, yet the most common category of years of acquisition experi-
ence was only 6–10 years.  (Does this mean that the more senior acquisition 
professionals were too busy, or too jaded, to complete the survey?)
•	 The	most	common	age	category	among	FAC	holders	was	51–55	years,	
with millennials accounting for 11.3% of the acquisition workforce.  (Again, 
given the response rate, we’re hesitant to conclude that we’re working with 
a representative sample of the actual workforce.)
In addition, earlier in the year, GAO concluded that DoD could do more 
to optimize the program management career field and community.
The military services recognize that they need skilled program 
managers to develop acquisition programs and have taken steps to 
develop that top-notch talent. ... 
Yet, [despite a solid training regimen, establishment of professional 
standards, and sharing of lessons learned] when compared to 
leading practices, we found that several practices used by the 
military services for training, mentoring, retaining, and selecting 
people for program manager positions could be improved….
In nearly all cases, the military services could improve their 
practices by learning from ideas and initiatives being used by 
another military service or by commercial companies and ensuring 
that civilian and military personnel have similar opportunities to 
develop.
GAO-18-217, Defense Acquisition Workforce: Opportunities Exist to Im-
prove Practices for Developing Program Managers (February 2018), available 
at www.gao.gov/assets/700/690094.pdf; DOD Can Improve Development Of 
Acquisition Program Managers, 60 GC ¶ 59 (among other things, GAO said 
the Air Force could improve its retention and selection practices; the Army 
could improve training, mentoring, and retention; and the Navy, which merited 
special attention, has “practices that do not extensively align with leading 
practices in each of the areas of training, mentoring, retaining, and selecting 
program managers”).
Vii. PRoCUReMenT DATA: BeTTeR GRAPHiCS, SAMe DATA?
A. Data Crunching the Federal Procurement Spend.  In a break 
from (longstanding) tradition, the Chapter does not offer a detailed report of 
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last fiscal year’s procurement and grant spending.  We expect that, as more 
fulsome data becomes available, FY2018 will reflect mixed results, initially 
slowed by continuing resolutions (CR’s) and uncertainty, with a frantic rush 
at the end of the fiscal year (FY), but, overall, less spending than in FY2017. 
FY2019, of course, is off to an uneven start with many agencies fully funded, 
while others are bogged down by appropriations paralysis.
B. Test Driving the new “Data Lab.” We were intrigued by USAS-
pending.gov’s new DataLab (still in Beta), which offers a broad range of 
eye-catching graphics and insights.  For example, the DataLab graphically 
illustrates that, in FY 2017, over 60 percent of federal contract dollars were 
competitively awarded through 21,858,521 competitive actions (representing 
$320 billion), as compared to 925,888 non-competitive actions (representing 
$190 billion). (If we understand the data, that suggests that noncompetitive 
procurements tend to be significantly larger than their competitive siblings. 
We also assume, of course, that the data excludes, among other things, mil-
lions of micro-purchase transactions.)  
For our purposes, there was much of interest in the section: Contract 
Spending Analysis: How has federal contract spending changed over time?, 
see https://datalab.usaspending.gov/contracts-over-time.html.  The DataLab 
shows, over the past ten years:
•	 a	slow	increase	from	$470B	in	federal	procurement	spending	in	
FY 2007, to a peak of $560B in FY2010;
•	 a	steady	decrease	from	FY2011	to	a	low	of	$440B	in	FY	2015;
•	 an	short-term	upward	trend,	with	FY	2016	at	$470B	and	FY	2017	
at $510B; and, unfortunately
•	 only	partial	data	(a	round	$200B)	for	FY	2018	(as	of	March	31,	
excluding, of course, the end-of-year binge in August and Septem-
ber 2018).
One of the most entertaining graphics reflects the distribution of contracts 
awarded over the course of the fiscal year.  
•	 While	no	one	should	be	surprised	that	the	last	two	weeks	of	September	
are the highest (and represent significant outliers on the chart), the chart 
also indicates that “spending tended to rise and fall on a monthly cadence, 
with roughly one small peak and one small drop per month.” Frankly, we 
have no idea what to make of this. And, while we’re not surprised that the 
last week of December and the first week of January represent the two least 
active weeks of the year, we can’t explain why the first week of April is the 
most active week outside the month of September. 
•	 Moreover,	“the	 end-of-year	 spikes	 consistently	 occurred	across	 the	
decade, and … [o]n average[,] September spikes accounted for between 6-8 
percent of the annual spending in a fiscal year.”
•	 At	the	same	time,	we	thought	it	made	perfect	sense	that	“[m]odifica-
tions … displayed less variance and did not spike as drastically at the end of 
each fiscal year. This suggests that new contracts—not modifications—drove 
the spikes at the end of each fiscal year.”
•	 The	 data	 suggests	 that	 “Facilities,	Equipment,	 and	Construction	
[contracts] displayed about 3.5 times the level of variance over the decade 
as total contract spending, and over 50 times the variance of spending on 
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Weapons and Ammunition … [which] did not spike at the end of the fiscal 
year.” [Emphasis added.]
•	 “[R]esearch	and	development	[R&D]	spending	was	less	variable	and	
less impacted by continuing resolutions….” The DataLab team ruminated 
that, “[a]s one of the smallest categories of spending, it is possible that this 
type of contract is partially sheltered from the timing of congressional ap-
propriations.”
•	 Given	current	events,	it’s	worth	noting	that	“the	passage	of	a	continu-
ing resolution increased total contract spending by 25 percent in the same week, 
all else held equal. [Conversely,] passage of new appropriations resulted in 
a decrease in total contract spending of 30 percent in the same week, all else 
held equal.... [Of course, that makes sense, because, i]f agencies are unable 
to issue new contracts because adequate funds are not available under con-
tinuing resolutions, needs accumulate, and then are satisfied once funding is 
available.” [Emphasis added.]
C. Consume Your Data With A Grain of Salt.  Despite the splendid 
graphical presentations provided by the Department of Treasury on the 
USASpending.gov website, concerns remain with the accuracy and currency 
of the underlying data in the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS). 
Agencies Underreported Federal IT Acquisitions, Did Not Obtain Required 
CIO Approval, GAO Finds, 60 GC  ¶ 10 (“most agencies did not identify all 
of their information technology contracts, and eight failed to identify over 
40 percent of their IT contract obligations” (emphasis added)); GAO-18-42, 
Information Technology: Agencies Need to Involve Chief Information Officers 
in Reviewing Billions of Dollars in Acquisitions, available at www.gao.gov/
assets/690/689346.pdf; Inaccurate Procurement Data Undermine SBA’s 
Contract Reporting, IG Says, 60 GC ¶ 328, www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/
oig/SBA-OIG-Report-19-01.pdf; SBA Small Business Procurement Scorecard 
Methodology Needs Further Revisions, 60 GC ¶ 310; GAO-18-672, Small 
Business Administration: Actions Needed to Improve Confidence in Small 
Business Procurement Scorecard (September 2018) (GAO recommended that 
SBA design and implement a comprehensive evaluation to assess scorecard 
revisions, and institute a process for reviewing scorecards for accuracy prior 
to publication and a mechanism for disclosing corrected information.), avail-
able at www.gao.gov/assets/700/694777.pdf; POGO Offers Recommendations 
to Improve USAspending.gov, https://www.pogo.org/letter/2018/06/pogo-
offers-recommendations-to-improve-usaspendinggov/ (8 of 97 agencies are 
late (including DoD, almost a year behind) in reporting DATA Act spending 
information; other government programs have submitted very few spending 
records or none), see also https://about.bgov.com/blog/federal-spending-
site-still-lacks-data-revamp-report-says/.  Nor is the data set keeping up 
with the rapidly evolving global open data standards.  See GAO-19-72, Open 
Data: Treasury Could Better Align USAspending.gov with Key Practices and 
Search Requirements (December 2018), available at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/700/696023.pdf.  
Meanwhile, the service contract inventory exercise continues, ap-
parently satisfying no one.  DOD Still Not Using Service Contracts Inventory 
To Inform Decision-Making, 60 GC ¶ 115 (GAO noted that military services 
generally have no plans to use the contract services inventory to inform 
management and budget decisions, although 10 USCA § 2330a(e), requires 
them to do so), GAO-18-330, DOD Contracted Services: Long-Standing Issues 
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Remain about Using Inventory for Management Decisions, available at www.
gao.gov/assets/700/690954.pdf.  In addition to others, PSC has advocated 
eliminating the inventories because, among other things, service contract 
inventory reporting has produced limited value for the significant amount 
of effort required of contractors and related work required of agencies. See 
59 GC ¶ 254.
D. Comparing the Costs of Contractor and Government Person-
nel.  On a related note, we now have more data that reminds us that no one 
has (yet) proven that contractors are more (or less) expensive than govern-
ment personnel, in large part because no one has created a reliable, verifi-
able algorithm or tool to, in effect, compare apples to oranges. DOD noted 
that, although the results were not generalizable across DoD, “for the 21,000 
federal civilians and service contractors compared, neither federal civilians 
nor service contractors were predominately more or less expensive, with the 
costs being dependent upon the function being performed, location, and level 
of expertise.” That conclusion should surprise no one. GAO subsequently as-
sessed DOD’s report and determined that DoD’s analysis addressed most of 
the elements in Congress’ request for the assessment.  DOD Workforce Cost 
Comparison Report Addresses Congressional Request, GAO Finds, 60 GC ¶ 
140; GAO-18-399, Civilian and Contractor Workforces: DOD’s Cost Compari-
sons Addressed Most Report Elements but Excluded Some Costs (April 2018), 
available at www.gao.gov/assets/700/691305.pdf.
Viii. oPTiMiSM AMiD ADVeRSiTY?  SToRM CLoUDS oR  
 SiLVeR LininG?
Regular attendees know that this review has consistently and promi-
nently featured the Professional Services Council Acquisition Policy Sur-
veys of acquisition experts and leaders, which, for more than fifteen years, 
have collected “opinions and insights from federal government acquisition 
leaders on the current state of the acquisition profession, the impact of 
policy initiatives, noteworthy trends, and future challenges and opportu-
nities.” The 2018 survey, true to form, is instructive, primarily because it 
includes the opinion of a broad and experienced cross-section of knowl-
edgeable practitioners (from both the government and the private sector). 
Optimism Amid Adversity, The 9th Biennial Professional Services Council 
Acquisition Policy Survey (July 2018), available from PSC, at https://www.
pscouncil.org/__p/cr/r/2016AcquisitionPolicySurvey.aspx.  Some of the 
key findings include:
Budget.  Even before the most recent counter-productive (yet, admittedly, 
only partial) government shut-down, far more than half of those surveyed 
expressed concern that budget conditions had deteriorated since 2016 (which, 
incidentally, marks the most precipitous decline since PSC began the survey). 
Respondents also bemoaned the inability to plan, with continuing resolutions 
(CRs), government shutdowns, and shifting spending caps injecting volatility 
into the budget cycle and, of course, compressing acquisition timelines.
Acquisition Workforce. If you are reading these materials, we do not 
need to convince you that successful contracting outcomes depend upon people. 
Unfortunately, respondents identified certain skill areas that continue to be 
lacking across the workforce, including developing requirements, buying “as 
a service,” negotiation, and critical thinking.  Moreover, it’s no surprise that, 
since 2016, hiring challenges have increased and are exacerbated by, among 
other things, budget instability and hiring freezes, which, of course, cumula-
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tively make it difficult to keep up with the pace and volume of change (and, 
of course, stifle innovation, but more on that, below).
innovation. Respondents expressed concern that innovation is not well 
understood and was stifled by, among other things, fear of oversight (or pro-
tests).  Although respondents were optimistic about other transactions (see 
above) and innovation laboratories, many still feared that the burdensome 
regulatory environment dissuaded to many innovative companies from doing 
business with the government. 
oversight and compliance.  Consistent with prior surveys, respondents 
pointed to the cumulative impact of frequently changing policies as detrimen-
tal to acquisition outcomes. High on the irritation and frustration scale were 
labor-related requirements, audits, and Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) 
compliance.  Those surveyed found GAO audits and OMB guidance gener-
ally valuable and, while they were divided on whether past performance was 
useful, they tended to agree that congressional oversight was less valuable. 
Communication and collaboration.  A longstanding source of frustra-
tion - think back to the Dan Gordon-era OFPP myth-busters campaign – pro-
vided a source of optimism and potential improvements – particularly with 
regard to enhanced debriefings and reverse industry days (RID’s). Nonetheless, 
failure to communicate still, too often, impeded the achievement of successful 
acquisition outcomes (and created barriers to entry).
iX. LAUGHTeR THe BeST MeDiCine?  
In case you missed it, we’re recommending you make time for our favor-
ite (short) document of the year. See Defense Innovation Board (DIB): DIB 
Guide: Detecting Agile BS (Version 0.4, last modified 3 Oct 2018 – WORK-
ING DOCUMENT//DRAFT), available at https://media.defense.gov/2018/
Oct/09/2002049591/-1/-1/0/DIB_DETECTING_AGILE_BS_2018.10.05.
PDF.  Beginning from the premise that: “Agile is a buzzword of software 
development, and so all DoD software development projects are, almost by 
default, now declared to be “agile[,]” the document is rich with valuable in-
sights, recommendations, and quips, such as:
Key flags that a project is not really agile [include]: Nobody on 
the software development team is talking with and observing the 
users of the software in action; we mean the actual users of the 
actual code. (The Program Executive Office (PEO) does not count 
as an actual user, nor does the commanding officer, unless she uses 
the code.)   A footnote elaborates that “Acceptable substitutes for 
talking to users: Observing users working, putting prototypes in 
front of them for feedback, and other aspects of user research that 
involve less talking.” . . . .
Questions for Program Management [include]: How many 
programmers are part of the organizations that owns the budget 
and milestones for the program? (Wrong answers: “we don’t know,” 
“zero,” “it depends on how you define a programmer”)
See also, Kevin McCaney, Defense Innovation Board Issues Guide to 
‘Detecting Agile BS’: Industry experts advise government agencies to weed 
out the fakes, (October 19, 2018), at https://www.governmentciomedia.com/
defense-innovation-board-issues-guide-detecting-agile-bs (The document 
“aims to help Department of Defense officials separate the bona fide from 
the buzz.... Among the guide’s red flags that the agile claim is not authentic 
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is that users are kept out of the loop....  For the DIB, the problem isn’t with 
agile, it’s with those who say they’re using an agile approach in order to score 
points with the people holding the purse strings, but aren’t delivering the 
goods.”).  See also, DOD IG Questions Air Force’s Agile Software Development 
For F-22 Modernization, 60 GC ¶ 116, DODIG-2018-089, Contracting Strategy 
for F-22 Modernization (“Agile has historically only been used for software 
development and has not previously been used for hardware development on 
DoD weapon systems…. The use of agile across DoD is increasing, and it is 
imperative that DoD address the use of methodologies like agile by updating 
acquisition guidance.” IG also noted that a contracting strategy for scaled 
agile framework was not identified; nor was there sufficient DoD policy for 
implementing agile software development methods), available at media.
defense.gov/2018/Mar/26/2001894248/-1/-1/1/DODIG-2018-089.PDF.
